

SIU EXPORT CONTROLS MONTHLY

ISSUE #16
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NEWS AND UPDATES

EUROPE SETS OUT WHAT ARE ‘SAFE’ RESEARCH LINKS WITH CHINA

European governments and institutions are becoming more aware of challenges and pressures on continuing extensive research collaboration with China, with several countries and the European Union drawing up new guidelines to step up knowledge security and academic integrity, and for protection of academic freedom.

<https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20201106110010775>

A New Institutional Approach to Research Security in the United States: Defending a Diverse R&D Ecosystem

U.S. research security requires trust and collaboration between those conducting R&D and the federal government. Most R&D takes place in the private sector, outside of government authority and control, and researchers are wary of federal government or law enforcement involvement in their work. Despite these challenges, as adversaries work to extract science, technology, data and know-how from the United States, the U.S. government is pursuing an ambitious research security initiative.

<https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/a-new-institutional-approach-to-research-security-in-the-united-states/>

BIDEN ANNOUNCES DOD CHINA TASK FORCE

President Joe Biden announced the formation of a DOD China Task Force to provide a baseline assessment of department policies, programs and processes in regard to the challenge China poses.

<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2500271/biden-announces-dod-china-task-force/source/GovDelivery/>

CHINESE TALENT PROGRAM TRACKER

The Chinese Talent Program Tracker is a catalogue of Chinese Party-State-sponsored initiatives aimed at cultivating China's domestic talent pool in support of China's strategic civilian and military goals. If you work with or are contacted by any of the programs, **please call 618-650-2476 immediately.**

<https://chinaltalenttracker.cset.tech/>

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SIU CLEAN LAPTOP PROGRAM EQUIPMENT USED IN RESEARCH

All SIU System employees, SIUE faculty and staff, SIUC faculty and staff, SIU School of Medicine faculty and staff; as well as all satellite campus faculty and staff, including but not limited to, the SIU School of Dental Medicine, The National Corn to Ethanol Research Center, The East St. Louis Center, SIU Law School and all SIU Extended Campus locations that travel to the designated foreign countries.

All SIU travel to the below countries WILL REQUIRE that an Informational Technology Services clean laptop be used during SIU business travel to those countries. Your SIU issued laptop computer SHALL NOT be transported to any of the below countries.

IRAN

SYRIA

SUDAN

NORTH KOREA

CUBA

UKRAINE (Crimea Region)

CHINA

RUSSIA

VENEZUELA

<https://siusystem.edu/academic-affairs/export-controls/travel.shtml>

EXPORT CONTROL VIOLATION

HOTLINE

If you suspect an export control violation, call:

618-650-2476

If you use the following equipment/goods in your research or the below is your area of research, **please call the Director of Export Controls at 618-650-2476.**

•Advanced computing

•Advanced materials

•Advanced surveillance

•Artificial intelligence

•Biotechnology

•Brain-computer interfaces

•Data analytics technology

•Hyper sonics

•Logistics technologies

•Microprocessor technology

•Position, navigation and timing (PNT) technology

•Quantum information and sensing technology

•Robotics

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“THE DAILY BUGLE” QUOTES

- **“Elections belong to the people. It's their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.”**
— Abraham Lincoln
- **“Protest beyond the law is not a departure from democracy; it is absolutely essential to it.”**
— Howard Zinn
- **The liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerated the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than the democratic state itself. That in its essence is fascism: ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or any controlling private power.”**
— Franklin D. Roosevelt

REGULATIONS

- [DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS \(EAR\)](#)
- [DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS \(ITAR\)](#)
- [DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS \(OFAC FACR\)](#)

SIU EXPORT CONTROL MANUAL 2019

<http://siusystem.edu/academic-affairs/export-controls/policies.shtml>

THE CHINA DEFENSE UNIVERSITIES TRACKER

<https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/>

A database of Chinese institutions engaged in military or security-related science and technology research. It was created by ASPI's International Cyber Policy Centre. It includes entries on nearly 100 civilian universities, 50 People's Liberation Army institutions, China's nuclear weapons program, three Ministry of State Security institutions, four Ministry of Public Security universities, and 12 state-owned defense industry conglomerates.

The Tracker is a tool to inform universities, governments and scholars as they engage with the entities from the People's Republic of China. It aims to build understanding of the expansion of military-civil fusion—the Chinese government's policy of integrating military and civilian efforts—into the education sector.

The Tracker should be used to inform due diligence of Chinese institutions. However, the fact that an institution is not included here does not indicate that it should not raise risks or is not involved in defense research. Similarly, entries in the database may not reflect the full range and nature of an institution's defense and security links.

“TALENT PROGRAM” FAQ’S

What is a foreign “TALENTS” program?

Any foreign state sponsored attempt to acquire U.S.-funded scientific research through recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States. In general, Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs include any foreign-state-sponsored attempt to acquire U.S. scientific-funded research or technology through foreign government-run or funded recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States.

These recruitment programs are often part of broader whole-of-government strategies to reduce costs associated with basic research while focusing investment on military development or dominance in emerging technology sectors. The Department of Energy issued an order on 7 July 2019 with fairly clear explanations of Talents programs. Much of the information in this guidance Document is extracted from DOE O 486.1.

https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/400-series/0486-1-border/@_images/file

How does this affect SIU and me?

Association with a Talents Program can lead to ineligibility to receive Federal funding for your research. Currently there is no due process to challenge such a determination or limit to the time interval over which it is imposed. Past associations may also be concerning to the US Government.

Is there an official list of Talents Programs?

No. Some have been identified but for the most part, we are left to our own judgement. Note that entities can frequently change their names once they are identified on a list. The most accurate current list for China is:

<https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/>

How do I recognize such a program?

Distinguishing features of a foreign government talent recruitment program include:

- Compensation provided by the foreign state to the targeted individual in exchange for the individual transferring their knowledge and expertise to the foreign country. The compensation can take several forms, such as cash, research funding, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, promised future compensation, or other types of remuneration or consideration.
- Recruitment in this context refers to the foreign-state-sponsor’s active engagement in attracting the targeted individual to join the foreign sponsored program and transfer their knowledge and expertise to the foreign state. The targeted individual may be employed and located in the U.S., or in the foreign state. Recruitment would not necessarily include an invitation to attend or present work at an international conference.
- Many, but not all, programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to physically relocate to the foreign state. Of particular concern are those programs that allow for continued employment at U.S. research facilities or receipt of US Federal research funds while concurrently receiving compensation from the foreign state.
- Focus on individual researcher instead of project/subject matter

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- Remuneration (salary, stipend, research funding, etc.) significantly above “market” for expected activities
- Foreign entity title for researcher implies greater connection than underlying facts
- Foreign residency application encouraged or facilitated
- Requires changing of researcher’s primary institute affiliation for purposes of journal citations
- Fundamental research purpose unclear or undefined

Are such programs initiated by a particular country?

Any country can run a talents program. Most of the US Government’s attention has been focused on programs originating in China, but talents programs have been identified from India, China, Russia, and other nations. What should you do if you suspect you have been contacted by or have inadvertently become associated with a Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program?

If something appears to be too good to be true, you should question it.

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