

SIU EXPORT CONTROLS MONTHLY

ISSUE #18
May 7, 2021

SIU EXPORT CONTROL MONTHLY IS INTENDED AS A RESOURCE FOR CURRENT EXPORT CONTROL ISSUES AND EVENTS THAT COULD AFFECT SIU AND ITS FACULTY.



NEWS AND UPDATES



U.S. COMMERCE DEPT EXPANDS SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA AFTER NAVALNY POISONING

The United States on Wednesday said it was tightening sanctions on some exports to Russia in response to the poisoning of Kremlin critic leader Alexei Navalny, partially excluding certain items such as those related to aviation and space.

<file:///C:/Users/twakela/Desktop/U.S.%20Commerce%20Dept%20expands%20sanctions%20on%20Russia%20after%20Navalny%20poisoning%20Reuters.htm>

2021 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, in coordination with Intelligence Community leaders, released to Congress an unclassified annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States. Pursuant to Section 617 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, the annual assessment examines the diverse array of threats that exist against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, great power competition, and rapidly evolving technology.

<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community>

HOSPITAL RESEARCHER SENTENCED TO PRISON FOR CONSPIRING TO STEAL TRADE SECRETS AND SELL TO CHINA

An Ohio man was sentenced yesterday to 33 months in prison for conspiring to steal exosome-related trade secrets concerning the research, identification and treatment of a range of pediatric medical conditions. Yu Zhou, 51, of Dublin, Ohio, pleaded guilty in December 2020 to stealing scientific trade secrets related to exosomes and exosome isolation from Nationwide Children's Hospital's Research Institute for his own personal financial gain. Zhou also conspired to commit wire fraud. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hospital-researcher-sentenced-prison-conspiring-steal-trade-secrets-and-sell-china>

CHINESE TALENT PROGRAM TRACKER

The Chinese Talent Program Tracker is a catalogue of Chinese Party-State-sponsored initiatives aimed at cultivating China's domestic talent pool in support of China's strategic civilian and military goals. If you work with or are contacted by any of the programs, please call 618-650-2476 immediately.

<https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/>

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SIU CLEAN LAPTOP PROGRAM

All SIU System employees, SIUE faculty and staff, SIUC faculty and staff, SIU School of Medicine faculty and staff; as well as all satellite campus faculty and staff, including but not limited to, the SIU School of Dental Medicine, The National Corn to Ethanol Research Center, The East St. Louis Center, SIU Law School and all SIU Extended Campus locations that travel to the designated foreign countries.

All SIU travel to the below countries WILL REQUIRE that an Informational Technology Services clean laptop be used during SIU business travel to those countries. Your SIU issued laptop computer SHALL NOT be transported to any of the below countries.

IRAN

SYRIA

SUDAN

NORTH KOREA

CUBA

UKRAINE (Crimea Region)

CHINA

RUSSIA

VENEZUELA

<https://siusystem.edu/academic-affairs/export-controls/travel.shtml>

EXPORT CONTROL VIOLATION

HOTLINE

If you suspect an export control violation, call:

618-650-2476

EQUIPMENT USED IN RESEARCH

If you use the following equipment/goods in your research or the below is your area of research, **please call the Director of Export Controls at 618-650-2476.**

Pumps, high pressure..... 0A998.b.3

Pumps, liquid propellant.....9A106.d

Pumps, lithium amalgam.....1B233.b.2

Pumps, mercury or lithium amalgam.....1B233.b.2

Pumps, multiple-seal..... 2B350.i

Pumps, potassium amide in liquid ammonia. 1B230

Pumps, seal-less..... 2B350.i

Pumps, vacuum..... 2B231

Pumps, vacuum..... 2B350.i

Pumps designed for industrial service..... 2B999.j

Pumps designed to move molten metals by

electromagnetic force 2A993

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“THE DAILY BUGLE” QUOTES

***“IF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS TAKEN AWAY
THEN DUMB AND SILENT WE MAY BE LED,
LIKE SHEEP TO THE SLAUGHTER.”***

George Washington

***“BEING OFFENDED BY FREEDOM OF SPEECH
SHOULD NEVER BE REGARDED AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR VIOLENCE”***

Alan Dershowitz

***“EVERYONE IS IN FAVOR OF FREE SPEECH.
HARDLY A DAY PASSES WITHOUT ITS BEING
EXTOLLED, BUT SOME PEOPLE'S IDEA OF IT IS
THAT THEY ARE FREE TO SAY WHAT THEY
LIKE, BUT IF ANYONE ELSE SAYS ANYTHING
BACK, THAT IS AN OUTRAGE”***

Winston Churchill

***“WHOEVER WOULD OVERTHROW THE LIBERTY
OF A NATION MUST BEGIN BY SUBDUING THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH”***

Benjamin Franklin

REGULATIONS

- [DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS \(EAR\)](#)
- [DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS \(ITAR\)](#)
- [DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS \(OFAC FACR\)](#)

SIU EXPORT CONTROL MANUAL 2019

<http://siusystem.edu/academic-affairs/export-controls/policies.shtml>

THE CHINA DEFENSE UNIVERSITIES TRACKER

<https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/>

A database of Chinese institutions engaged in military or security-related science and technology research. It was created by ASPI's International Cyber Policy Centre. It includes entries on nearly 100 civilian universities, 50 People's Liberation Army institutions, China's nuclear weapons program, three Ministry of State Security institutions, four Ministry of Public Security universities, and 12 state-owned defense industry conglomerates.

The Tracker is a tool to inform universities, governments and scholars as they engage with the entities from the People's Republic of China. It aims to build understanding of the expansion of military-civil fusion—the Chinese government's policy of integrating military and civilian efforts—into the education sector.

The Tracker should be used to inform due diligence of Chinese institutions. However, the fact that an institution is not included here does not indicate that it should not raise risks or is not involved in defense research. Similarly, entries

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in the database may not reflect the full range and nature of an institution's defense and security links.

“TALENT PROGRAM” FAQ’S

What is a foreign “TALENTS” program?

Any foreign state sponsored attempt to acquire U.S.-funded scientific research through recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States. In general, Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs include any foreign-state-sponsored attempt to acquire U.S. scientific-funded research or technology through foreign government-run or funded recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States.

These recruitment programs are often part of broader whole-of-government strategies to reduce costs associated with basic research while focusing investment on military development or dominance in emerging technology sectors. The Department of Energy issued an order on 7 July 2019 with fairly clear explanations of Talents programs. Much of the information in this guidance Document is extracted from DOE O 486.1.

<https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/400-series/0486-1-border/@@@images/file>

How does this affect SIU and me?

Association with a Talents Program can lead to ineligibility to receive Federal funding for your research. Currently there is no due process to challenge such a

determination or limit to the time interval over which it is imposed. Past associations may also be concerning to the US Government.

Is there an official list of Talents Programs?

No. Some have been identified but for the most part, we are left to our own judgement. Note that entities can frequently change their names once they are identified on a list. The most accurate current list for China is: <https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/>

How do I recognize such a program?

Distinguishing features of a foreign government talent recruitment program include:

- Compensation provided by the foreign state to the targeted individual in exchange for the individual transferring their knowledge and expertise to the foreign country. The compensation can take several forms, such as cash, research funding, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, promised future compensation, or other types of remuneration or consideration.
- Recruitment in this context refers to the foreign-state-sponsor's active engagement in attracting the targeted individual to join the foreign sponsored program and transfer their knowledge and expertise to the foreign state. The targeted individual may be employed and located in the U.S., or in the foreign state. Recruitment would not necessarily include an invitation to attend or present work at an international conference.
- Many, but not all, programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to physically relocate to the foreign state. Of particular concern are those programs that allow

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for continued employment at U.S. research facilities or receipt of US Federal research funds while concurrently receiving compensation from the foreign state.

- Focus on individual researcher instead of project/subject matter
- Remuneration (salary, stipend, research funding, etc.) significantly above “market” for expected activities
- Foreign entity title for researcher implies greater connection than underlying facts
- Foreign residency application encouraged or facilitated
- Requires changing of researcher’s primary institute affiliation for purposes of journal citations
- Fundamental research purpose unclear or undefined

Are such programs initiated by a particular country?

Any country can run a talents program. Most of the US Government’s attention has been focused on programs originating in China, but talents programs have been identified from India, China, Russia, and other nations. What should you do if you suspect you have been contacted by or have inadvertently become associated with a Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program?

If something appears to be too good to be true, you should question it.

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